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"Surprise and the Single Scenarios" is the title of a rather thought
provoking article by Sir James Cable.* The essence of his thesis is that the
United Kinadom should not prepare its military with iust one contingency in
mind. Related thesis have been debated in the East and West for many years;
should Soviet military strategy be based upon the doctrinal assumption of
quick escalation to nuclear war? Should U.S. nuclear forces be procurred with
the requirement to survive a well executed surprise first strike?
In considering these and related political-military auestions, scenarios
are often created to flesh out the concept being considered. For examole,
military planners in the USSR undoubtably use alternating scenarios to
consider possible courses that armed conflict could take in order that they
might assess the impact of short or long time scales on nuclear/conventional
interactions. Similarly, varying scenarios are used in the U.S. to
demonstrate the impact of different threat assumptions on the amount and types
of nuclear forces that the U.S. should buy that would "guarantee" an
acceptable level of retaliation.
The major point to all this, and this report, is that in order to perform
complex political military assessments, political scientists either
explicitly or implicitly use operations analysis techniques, including
simulations, gaming, and scenarios. Many of the critics of these technioues
have frequently dismissed their results by saying that the results of such
techniques are "scenario limited."
Rather than bemoan such limitations, it is my intent to exDl ore the
opportunities and drawbacks of scenarios used in simulations and gaming when
such techniques are used to explore complex political -military questions.
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The major point to all this, and this report, is that in order to perform
complex political military assessments, political scientists either
explicitly or implicitly use operations analysis techniques, including
simulations, gaming, and scenarios. Many of the critics of these techniques
have frequently dismissed their results by saying that the results of such
techniques are "scenario limited."
Rather than bemoan such limitations, it is my intent to explore the
opportunities and drawbacks of scenarios used in simulations and gaming when
such techniques are used to explore complex political-military questions.
What Does a Scenario Depend Upon?
Scenarios cannot simply be congured up without consideration of the
simulation, game, or analysis that they are to support. Scenarios do not have
an intrinsic worth of their own: they are tools whose value is measured in
the degree of support that they give to some other endeavor.
As such, perhaps the most important determinant of the scenario is the
purpose for which it will be used. The purpose of the game will be influenced
by and in turn influence a number of other factors such as available game
time, game location, scenario time, sponsors, players participants. These
additional factors will be discussed later.
Many simulations are done for training. A basic example of this is the
fire drill for a shio's crew or the emergency procedures trainer for flight
crews. In these simulations, the scenario is used to set a semi- real istic
condition requiring personnel to exercise their skills in some area that
otherwise would not be experienced. The emergency conditions are carefully
controlled and participants are allowed to walk through their procedures, stop
and analyze specific actions, or repeat them if necessary. Once practiced in
a simulation, personnel actions taken in an actual emergency have the
advantage of this type of preparation.
On a more sophisticated level, education also makes use of simulations.
Long ago, lawyers recognized the value of moot court to assist candidates in
becoming practicing attorneys. Similarly, model United Nations or governments
are often used to expose students to the workings and authority of complex
bodies. These type educational singulations only make sense if some actors
are reauired to be taken; a scenario is played out.
When students here have to go through the steps necessary to pass a bill
or to defend a client, they see how political decisions are made and they
have the opportunity to re fine their skills in such settings. Players and
participants in these type simulations have the opportunity to learn much more
than the facts of the process being simulated.
Similarly, games and simulations can be conducted for the purpose of
stimulating well experienced participants to think. As such, the purpose of
this type of game/simulation is also education but it reauires a vastly
different type of scenario. For example, if already oualified specialists in a
particular political-military area were the players in a game whose scenario
was designed to explore that specific area, a more advanced scenario would be
required than if the players were being exposed to the concepts for the first
time.
The more a game attempts to explore combat, or other areas that we cannot
actually duplicate, the more interest there is in and reauirements for good
scenarios. If the underlying purpose of a war game is to not necessarily to
explore war but to educate military officers about the political nature of
war, a very sophisticated scenario is reauired. In such a case, games might
be the most successful way to reach some individuals. Despite the fact that
there are numerous articles and books on the relationship of war and politics,
or that there are many number of university level courses one could take to
discuss this area, the busy military officer may not have had the opportunity
to do any of these. Exposure to a well constructed game with a supporting
scenario might be just the short course necessary to get this most important
point across.
Similarly, a free wheeling game whose scenario allows flexibility, might
be just the vehicle to get a group of experts to interact on a topical issue
in their field of expertise. A shared topic of interest is normally discussed
by a group of experts by using the. symposium, conference, or seminar
environment. If on the other hand, such experts were involved in a game whose
scenarios stimulated them to think and deal with other experts in a
non-threatirg simulated environment, the results of such interactions might
well exceed that produced by more traditional methods. As an example, a group
of individuals who have already written numerous articles and books on the
subject of war termination might find that they stimulate others and it turn
are stimulated by the interactions of a game whose scenario was designed to
explore this issue.
To get a group to consider extremely complicated issues, war termination
being a good example, the scenario required might be one that is capable of
knocking the legs out from under the players. Using that case, rather than
have a scenario created out of the more customary cases of possible future
wars, a totally unexpected but intriguing scenario might be just the vehicle
to cause participants to focus on the major issue rather than how to fight or
prevent the war in the first place.
Just as the Kremlin's experiences and expectations for war termination
would not be a mirror image of those in the West, games and simulul ations can
be an excellent vehicle to expose participants to such asymmetries. A wen
thought out scenario can be used to help Western Army officers understand that
a future war in Europe/the Soviet Western Theater of Military Strategic .
Operations might not necessarily be represented by a series of pistons along
avenues of advance. The Soviet preferred method and style of operation is
instead, envelopment and encirclement. In this case, the war as fought by NATO
might not necessarily be the same as that being fought by the Warsaw Pact.
This creates complicated requirements for the design and play of a game.
Complex issues also require scenarios capable of moving from one spectrum
of politics and war to another in order to play out all possible interactions
that might occur. For example, in simulations, the arms control negotiation
process, one needs to factor in the role of legislatures, courts, public
opinion, the media, allies, etc. to more fully flesh out the complex
interactions that influence or are influenced by the arms control issue at
hand.
Similarly, a complete war game should not deal only with the armed
conflict portion of the war. To do so will lead participants to believe that
escalation decisions only involve moving up or down the so-called vertical
escalation ladder or expanding/limiting armed conflict horizontally beyond or
to theaters of origin. A more correct respresentation of war involving
political, economic, moral and similar arenas would reveal that escalation
also involves economic warfare, world public opinion, actions by allies, and
the very crucial variable of time. Time as a variable in warfare is a most
frequently overlooked one that scenarios by their very nature force
participants to deal with. The act of extending the period of a war is also
more correctly viewed as escalation. Figure (1) is a representation of the
armed conflict portion of warfare. Similar diagrams need to be created for
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By their very nature, games and simulations tend to focus investigation
of outputs rather than inputs. As an example, a war game dealing with the air
land battle on follow-on forward attack operations will help illuminate the
net worth of either of the two concepts in achieving their objectives; not on
input measures, i.e. the intrinsic nature of the command structure or on the
forces to be purchases. I f outputs are a better measure of political-military
effectiveness, then this serves as prima facia evidence as to the worth of
games to the threat and net assessment process.
Games and simulations may in fact be a major input to such analytic
processes or conducted for other very specific purposes. In such cases, the
scenario may be constrained by these other requirements. For example, if a
game is designed to surface strategy/force mismatches, the scenarios may have
to manipulate the force structure. Alternatively, forces can be held
constant, and the strategy varied. The latter can be very helpful in
illuminating better methods of conducting near- term campaigns. Generally,
programming is better served by scenarios that manipulate forces while war
planning is enhanced by variations in strategy while holdino the forces
constant to those actually on hand.
Programming and war planning games differ sianificantly and both need to
account for the differences in declaratory policies and actual ones. Although
forces tend to fight like they train, the actions one threatens to take in
order to support deterrence, are not necessarily the ones that nations
governed by real people will actually take when events actually occur.
Scenarios need to account for the actions taken before a war to deter it, the
very different action taken when planning to actually fight a war, and the
possibility of executing such plans, and the quite unique circumstances
undertaken to terminate a war.
Games and stimulations can allow nations to test new doctrines,
strategies, operations, tactics, or alternative force postures. A well
designed supporting scenario can help participants better understand the
relationship of political interests to required military capabilities. They
also can help those in positions of authority to understand that not only is
war a competitive process, but so is the period between the armed conflict
portion of wars.
Creative Use of Scenarios
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Royal Dutch/Shell used a technique of
"scenario planning" in order to prepare their business for a wide variety of
futures. 2 One of the results of this effort was that Shell's management was
better prepared for the 1973 oil crisis. Shell's scenario planning forced
managers to deal with uncertainty and thereby understand and anticipate risk.
It also helped them discover strategic options that they were not seriously
aware of. Such an exercise afforded Shell the opportunity to gain a
competitive advantage.
What is needed in the political -mil itary arena is a recognition that in
"peacetime," we are engaged in a long-term competitive relationship witr the
Soviet Union and perhaps other nations. ^ It is the authors opinion that with
the arrival of nuclear weapons, the thinking of many strategists, even those
in the military, precludes the use of the term "winning" during this peacetime
competition (or even during a future war).
Whether or not one can "win" a future war, or whether or not we are in a
competitive relationship with the USSR is not the issue for this paper. One
can argue that the Soviets accept "winning" as the logical goal of any
political conflict, but even if one assumes future wars are to be fought to a
draw or that there is no competition between nations, scenarios and games
offer governments the opportunity to explore ways to gain competitive
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advantage or to at least force an opponent into a situation where he will not
attempt to "win."
Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz's experience prior to World War II in gaming
possible conflict in the Pacific Theater have often been cited as one of the
best examples of the value of gaming. Gaming efforts of the faculty and staff
of the Naval War College in Newport between the World Wars allowed Nimitz to
1 ater remark that:
"The war with Japan had been re-enacted in the game room here by
so many people and in so many different ways that nothing that
happened during the war was a surprise - absolutely nothing
except the Kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war; we had
not visualized those." 4
One major difference in those war games and some of the ones being conducted
today is, of course, that for Nimitz, "winning" in war was a perfectly natural
and acceptable goal
.
New techniques of artificial intelligence-like systems offer game
sponsors the opportunity to explore wider ranges of alternative futures than
have ever been possible before. 5 Games are not a substitute for reality nor a
method of analysis but such new techniaues afford us a tool to investigate
alternate future scenarios and thereby assist analysts in assessing their
impact. In other words, given a set of "what if" political, military, or
economic conditions, modern gaming techniaues can help government and
businesses explore future scenarios that they might have to deal with.
With the speed available in these new techniques, instead of running one
or even a handful of game and simulations each year, modern simulations
centers will be able to run literally hundreds of alternate cases. By
manipulating one or a few variables and holding the rest constant, analyst may
be better able to perform sensitivity and contingency analysis like they have
never been able to do in manual games. Previous human games can be re-played
by such techniques offering the first real opportunity to validate previous
observations.
On the other hand, human play and large man-machine simulations will
continue in the future for a wide variety of reasons. Although the advantages
and opportunities of new gaming techniques are beginning to be appreciated,
enormous caution must be exercised in their use. The modeling community
cannot allow its sponsor to think that gaming and simulation lessons and
insights that result from the manipulation of software or machines are any
more "scientific" or "important" than those gained from any simulation
techniaue.
Another use of scenarios is to create perceptions. For example; (1) if
the politburo reads in the Western open literature that NATO commanders say
that due to incomplete funding for conventional defense, NATO will have to
resort to early use of nuclear weapons in self-defense; and (2) the Soviets
percieve that there are nuclear weapons in Europe; and (3) the Warsaw Pact
military reports that there are frequent exercises by NATO that clearly are
designed to practice the early release of such weapons; then the politburo
would be justified in reaching the conclusion if they break the peace, they
risk nuclear war fighting.
Similarly, scenarios offer ttie opportunity for marketing ideas and
consensus building. For example, if the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy
was attempting to argue to the generals and marshals that his service was more
important than normally thought, you might expect him to ask for a world-wide
wargame or exercise where he would be allowed to demonstrate the opportunities
for the use of the fleet in a very favorable light. In fact, if such
10
supporting scenarios are not played out then the credibility of the threat to
employ his fleet worldwide is seriously undermined.
Considerations in Designing Scenarios
Although there should not be a "cookbook" for the creation of scenarios,
it has become apparent to me in dealing with a number of individuals who have
been asked to create scenarios, that some very key factors dre often
overlooked. « Hence, the following discussion is designed to assist the
specialist in gaming and simulations when considering a task to create a
scenario.
First - The scenario must be dependent upon the overall Durpose of the
game. As has been discussed earlier, whether or not a aame or simulation is
being played out for training, education, analysis and exploration,
perception management, or consensus building, all will have a major and
first order impact on the scenarios to be selected. Obviously, if a game
is designed to validate or perform sensitivity analysis on a previous game,
there will be major constraints on the scenario.*
Second - The available game time significantly influences the scenario
that can be played. Global war games at the Naval War College that last weeks
can go into much more depth than a half-day or one-day game held in Washington
by participants who are often answering phone calls while engaged in the play.
This is not to say that the long game is necessarily superior to the short
simulation; that judgement depends on a number of factors, it is only to say
that the scenario depends upon how long one can play.
*Important to caDture last minute or durina name modifications to preaame
scenario in this case. Artificial intell igence-1 ike systems with their
automated record keeping will greatly assist in subseouent replay of games.
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One can attempt to increase the depth of the short game scenario by
asking participants to read a scenario prior to the game. This may not work
for the busy participant and may not even be worth the efforts. Naturally if
a scenario contains classified material, the requirements to safeguard such
material and account for transit time may preclude this option entirely.
Third - The players themnselves will significantly influence the
scenarios. In my initial example of a fire drill, the scenario could be very
brief and the players are likely to be technical specialists not concerned
with major questions of policy. On the other hand, if one seeks the
participation of chief executive officers, branch and department heads, the
scenarios will most likely be very heavily oriented for ma.ior policy auestion
and concern itself at the strategic level. Macro analysis versus micro
analysis as the purpose during the game will result in vastly different
scenarios.
Similarly, the participation by players with experience and/or education
can also have a profound influence on the scenario. A macro approach war game
for flag and general officers might require a scenario with significant
emphasis on political context. The same game for academics might not work at
all given the wrong set of players.
Fourth - The scenario also depends upon the time and setting of the
simulation; i.e. what period o^ time the sponsor desires gamed and where the
game is to be played. Time is a frequently mishandled variable: Whereas
scenarios for present day games may be more easily created, the formulation of
future scenarios challenges even the best political scientist. Yet precisely
for this reason, games, simulations, and scenarios planning are powerful tools
to help analysts gain insight into the future.
Even replaying historical events with variations can challenge historians
to create an artificial environment of what might have been. Yet, historical
12
scenarios can be surrogates for present day situations that are otherwise
awkward to handle. A good example of this is the Soviet military method of
using historical scenarios to make points about auestions of doctrine,
strategy, operational art and tactics in an Aesopian web that substitute
historical case study for the present or anticipated future.
Path gaming presents similar challenges for the creation of a scenario.
One type of path game will pick an alternative future, say the President's
dream of a defense-dominate world or one in which there are no ballistic
missiles. The scenario for such a game is to go from the present time and
move along one or many paths to that goal. The scenario for such a game may
either be fixed or flexible. A path game that moves from the present to an
unspecified future is the most challenaing for the scenario writer since major
portions of the scenario literally is made up during the game itself. This
degree of flexibility calls for the use of personnel with experience and
special skills.
The physical location of a game is also a major but often overlooked
factor in setting a scenario. Games that cannot accommodate classified
material will reauire only unclassified scenarios and data bases. Facilities
that limit the number of players or that do not have the use of modern
artificial intelligence-like support systems or other computers aids will
result in less sophisticated scenarios than these which have these advantages.
Fifth - The sponsor of a game is a major variable in setting a scenario.
If the sponsor desires to use the game to assist in the exploration in the
nature of war campaigns, then a scenario that focuses on crisis response and
arms control is totally out of place. Similarly, one would expect that if an
agency sponsored a game, then the designers of the game and scenario would be




Scenario development for political-military game play does not need to be
as detailed as one might imagine. For example, if a game starts with the
current world conditions as is, a detailed state of the world or major
intelligence briefing is probably not reauired for the players. Control,
however, needs to have vast amounts of background material. Mew advances in
computer aids or in artificial intelligence will greatly assist both players
and control in keeping track a* scenario state.
Unfortunately, there is no simple answer to the question of how detailed
and complex a scenario must be to games in general. A large scenario might
turn off senior players who simply do not have the time to be brought up to
speed for a temporary simulation evolution. Similarly, a excruciatingly
detailed scenarios might so stifle the players that the creative intellectual
environment that the sponsor wanted cannot be achieved.
Scenarios simply cannot be written and left on a shelf to be pulled off
when required. The factors that influence the scenario are far too numerous
and important for such a process, although one might use such stored scenarios
as a strawman.
Good scenarios writing can assist sponsors in using games and simulations
to illuminate differences in perceptions, different concepts of operations,
and to make concrete certain difficult to understand abstract concepts. As
such, games and their supporting scenarios become one more tool for
political-military research. Scenario creation also results in a check list
of actions to be considered during real operations.
Scenarios creation in fact can be so important to the gaming and
simulation process that a case can be made that the input phase of the game
might even yield a higher pay off to the sponsor than will the results,
14
lessons learned, and other outputs.
The measure of effectiveness for a good scenario is whether or not it
helped the participants and control play a satisfactory game. If more time is
spent explaining or discussing the scenario than on the issues that the game
or simulation is designed to explore, then the scenario was probably not worth
it. The process of extracting the insights from the creation of a game, or
its conduct, is an extremly difficult and time consuming process; one which
takes longer than most sponsors are willing to allow.
We cannot afford to look only at single scenarios to political military
simulations. Rather, a wide variety o^ scenarios should be examined as a
sensitivity or contingency test: i.e. if finding hold up regardless of the
scenario, then we can feel more confident over them. To only game a single
scenario invites the type of myopia that lead to over reliance by the French
on its Magi not Line or on strategic bombing as a deterrent by the British
before World War II.
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